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ABSTRACT 
 
Teachers in academia are usually not required to have teacher training but must often be 
evaluated by their students who expect them to have much better teaching qualifications than their 
high school teachers. However, teachers in elementary and high schools are required to go 
through several years of teacher training, resulting in a teaching certificate, which is usually 
mandatory in the secondary school system.  This anomaly causes great tension in colleges and 
universities and often results in pressure to "improve" teaching evaluation in regard to academic 
level. In many countries, a doctorate degree in any field automatically allows its holder to teach in 
academic institutions because the students are expected to learn on their own while the professor 
is the expert responsible for helping with complicated questions. These discrepancies often 
hamper the advances of higher education.  
 
This paper presents the situation of teaching in higher education in selected countries, while 
presenting various paradigms for improving the state of teaching in higher education. The aim is 
to study the methodologies used to assess the quality of teaching in higher education systems, in 
general, and in Israel, specifically. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n the twentieth century, higher education experienced a transformation – from a limited elitist system, it 
became a system for the masses. This process, called the “massification of higher education” (Trow, 
1973), was manifested in a huge increase in the number of students throughout the 20
th
 century all over 
the Western world. In Europe in the 1950s, the percentage of undergraduate students was 3%-5% of the relevant age 
group. In the late 1990s, the number ranged from 36%-53%, and today it has reached more than 60% in most 
European countries (Lindberg, 2007). In the United States, a similar trend is evident, with the numbers currently 
encompassing 73% of the relevant population (Toutkoushian & Shafiq, 2010). Canada and Australia have 
undergone a similar process and the number of undergraduate students has exceeded 50% (Finnie & Usher, 2007). 
Israel also has joined this global trend and is part of the revolution in higher education. The 1990s saw the beginning 
of a huge demand for higher education in Israel, together with the opening of new institutions in response to this 
demand. The growth rate of Israeli students in the 1990s reached an annual average of 8.1%, and their numbers 
jumped from 76,000 in 1990 to 166,000 in 2000 (CBS, 2012). At present, with full utilization of the relevant age 
group for undergraduate studies, the annual growth rate has dropped to 3% and the total number of students is now 
298,400 (ibid.). From a wide point of view, this means a growth rate of several hundred percent in a matter of two 
decades. The huge increase in the relative number of students has resulted in an array of changes, challenges, and 
difficulties in systems of higher education (Davidovitch, Soen & Sinuany-Stern, 2011). One of the immediate 
implications of the transition to "mass education", particularly in a public educational system, is the burden on the 
national budget (Weiler, 2000). Countries invest from 0.5%-1.5% of their GNP in funding higher education and in 
OECD countries, this rate is particularly high, reaching 1.3% (Docampo, 2007). Tuition paid by students has 
I 
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remained low and institutions need a variety of external funding sources. Nonetheless, despite the significance of 
external funds, research universities rely mainly on internal-public funding sources. For example, internal funding of 
research universities in OECD countries in 2003 covered 94% (Auranen & Nieminen, 2010) of their budget, while 
the rest came from private funding. 
 
 The utilization of a public budget, together with the growth in the system of higher education and the 
demand for accountability, led many countries to embrace a new model of budgeting and resource allocation, 
attributing more significance to the evaluation and measurement of academic outcomes. Where formerly the main 
budgeting indicator was the proportion of students at the institution, at present, in light of the huge increase in this 
number in all institutions and the public budget that is not growing in direct proportion, many countries around the 
world have begun to assimilate additional indicators for budgeting institutions (Frolich & Strom, 2008(. These 
indicators refer to the general teaching and research output of the institutions and less to the input invested in 
teaching and research activities (PBC, 2012). This is a fundamental change on the policy level that emphasizes 
competition and outcome-related incentives, with the intention of turning universities into efficient productive 
systems (Auranen & Nieminen, 2010) – both by promoting research and by improving how resource allocation 
decisions are made (Pontille & Torny, 2010). Governments use various different competitive elements in the process 
of determining how institutions of higher education are budgeted and how resources are allocated. For example, 
resource allocation is determined by assimilating performance indicators by means of a "budgeting formula" or 
based on the evaluation of project proposals (Liefner, 2003). This is in addition to differences in the mix of external 
and internal funding in different countries. The aim of the current article is to review budgeting models applied 
around the world, as well as various funding mixes, and to present the model utilized in Israel, while discussing the 
efficiency of the various models. 
 
Mixed Budget Combinations 
 
 In general, it is possible to classify the various models for budgeting institutions of higher education by the 
degree to which they are based on external or internal funding or, in other words, the combination of external and 
internal funding. Internal funding relies mainly on government funding and on the university's assets. This budget is 
awarded to the institution as a block grant, without listing the different sections of the budget, to be used as it sees fit 
subject to a full report at the end of the year (Planning and Budget Committee, 2012). From the universities' point of 
view, government funding may also be perceived as external funding by nature if the university can decide on how 
the resources will be allocated within the organization (Auranen & Nieminen, 2010). In contrast, external funding is 
defined as private and public funding that is not part of the core budget and it may come from a variety of sources, 
such as public projects, grants, contract with the public administration, competitive research funds, donations, 
payments as a result of the commercialization of knowledge, and more (Hottenrott & Lawson, 2012). Auranen and 
Nieminen (2010) proposed an analytical framework (see Table 1) for mapping the institution's budget environment, 
which includes three parameters for determining the budgetary environment - funding sources, total rate of funding, 
and scope of incentives. The nature of the institution's budgeting environment is determined by the relationship 
between external and internal funding and the input-output orientation of core resources allocated. 
 
Table 1:  Analytical Framework For Positioning The Budgeting Model Of Research Universities 
Output-oriented core funding 
Small share of external funding 
Output-oriented core funding 
Great share of external funding 
Output 
Orientation Of 
Core Funding 
Devoted To 
Research 
Input-oriented core funding 
Small share of external funding 
Input-oriented core funding 
Great share of external funding 
Input 
Small Great  
Share Of External Funding For Research (Other Than Core Funds And Universities’ Own Assets) 
 
 The figure comprises two dimensions. The left side refers to a core budget based mainly on government 
funding. In such a case, the state has a significant role as institutions are dependent on this budget and affected by 
political decisions. On the right, universities have more funding sources and some of the government funding is 
provided by budgeting agents. In this case, the state's role is not necessarily weaker compared to the left rather less 
direct. In this case, there are other players (for example, private industry) and interest groups (Tandberg, 2010) that 
can directly affect the university's research orientation (see, for example, Hottenrott & Thorwarth, 2011) versus the 
other situation where these interests are represented indirectly by the state's decisions (Auranen & Nieminen, 2010). 
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The lower part describes a system of input and the upper part describes systems with an output orientation. In cases 
of output-based government budgeting, the effect of state decisions is usually weaker than a system with an input 
orientation. When the government budgeting is input-based, the state mainly stresses resource efficiency, where in 
cases of an output-based system there is a direct expectation that the university be efficient and produce measurable 
outcomes. In general, institutions where funding is mainly governmental are more sensitive to changes in how 
resources are allocated and to incentives provided by public funding. Nonetheless, the advantages of government 
funding are in increasing the system's stability. Then again, external funding might also present an opportunity for 
innovation and expansion of existing activities. Input-oriented systems are considered less dynamic that output-
oriented systems (Auranen & Nieminen, 2010). Following this typology, different models of budgeting utilized in 
different countries will be presented. 
 
Funding Models Around The World 
 
 Traditionally, most of the funding of institutions of higher education around the world came directly from 
the state, which allocated an input-based core budget (Hottenrott, 2012). In such a funding method, resource 
allocation is based on the budget of previous years, and the government may reduce or increase this budget based on 
changing needs of the institution (Liefner, 2003). This method, also called "trust-based funding", has been gradually 
neglected in recent decades in favor of "performance-based funding" which is awarded based on compatibility with 
performance indicators assimilated as part of the budgeting policy. Today there are almost no institutions that do not 
use performance indicators to some degree (Sörlin, 2007). For example, in a study by the OECD, 77% of all OECD 
countries were found to have assimilated performance indicators in the period 2000-2005 and about 50% of these 
countries reported a combination of input and output indicators (OECD, 2005, cited in Robinson, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the manner and degree in which these indicators dictate funding differs between countries. 
 
North America 
 
 The Anglo-American model of budgeting higher education is characterized by low external funding, high 
commitment to research and development, and extensive investment of private funds (Docampo, 2007). Funding 
models customary in the United States and Canada will be presented next. 
 
United States 
 
 Performance-based funding is a common policy in the United States (Barnetson & Cutright, 2000). From 
the early 21st century, organizations began to use terms of outcome-based policy (Kong, 2005) while from the late 
1970s, policy makers began to evaluate and budget institutions of higher education based on performance (Gaither, 
Nedwek & Neal, 1994). Higher education in the United States includes both private and public institutions. Private 
universities in the United States rely mainly on external budgeting and do not receive public funds. For example, 
MIT uses research grants, donations, contracts, and tuition as its main source of funding. In order to receive research 
funding, it is necessary to meet competitive terms. At MIT, the internal allocation of resources to departments and 
faculties is not based on performance, but rather on the previous year's budget and on the number of faculty 
positions. Hence, the allocation of resources within the institution is not based on performance indicators. 
Nonetheless, the fact that all funding comes from students and from external investments requires academic 
personnel to take an active part in raising external funding (Liefner, 2003). 
 
 In addition to the private universities, in the United States there are also public institutions that receive 
performance-based government funding (Layzell, 1999). These include public universities, community colleges, and 
government colleges. The public universities usually belong to states (for example, the University of California, 
Berkeley, and the University of California, Los Angeles, belong to the State of California; Indiana State University 
belongs to the State of Indiana) and community colleges belong to a city or district (for example, the Baruch College 
belongs to the City of New York) but may also belong to a state (for example, the New College of Florida belongs to 
the State of Florida). Public colleges are required to comply with federal norms defined in the Vocational and 
Technical Education Act (2006) that requires institutions to raise the proportion of graduates with degrees, the 
proportion of graduates in industry, and the proportion of those who continue to graduate studies. Colleges' 
indicators are evaluated by federal norms, but they do not receive bonuses for meeting goals (Sharma, 2004). 
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Moreover, each state has its own measures for evaluating the performance of its public institutions, both colleges 
and universities. Dougherty and Natow (2009) reviewed the number of states that opted for performance-based 
budgeting during 1979-2007 and concluded that these total 26 states. Nonetheless, the review shows that as of 2007, 
a large proportion of the states abandoned this method of budgeting and, at present, only 14 still use it. The 
researchers suggest that this is due, among other things, to the sharp drop in state funding of higher education as 
well as the lack of support for continued outcome-based funding by institutions of higher education and by business 
communities. 
 
 US states that still maintain a strong link between budgeting and resources tend to use varied indicators that 
reflect the significance given by the state and policy shapers to certain educational outcomes (Toutkoushian & 
Danielson, 2002). Toutkoushian and Danielson (2002) summarized the main indicators for evaluating research 
outcomes and input (see Appendix 1). The most prevalent input and output measures in US education include the 
number of publications per faculty member and the number of degrees awarded (outcomes) as well as the rate of 
graduates, average duration of studies, research foundations, student satisfaction, extent of donations, and other 
outcomes. 
 
Canada 
 
 Until 1995, higher education was funded by the federal government of Canada directly through transfer 
payments. Previously, the federal government sponsored mainly research activities at universities and funding was 
transferred to the various institutions as a global budget. In 1995, the federal government decided to change the 
budgeting method to enable more extensive monitoring of research. This change included separating budgeting for 
research and for other needs of the institutions, including teaching (Shanahan & Jones, 2007). 
 
 Funding of higher education with regard to the teaching component in Canada, excluding research, comes 
from two channels - the government and tuition paid by students. Over the years, the ratio between these two 
funding channels grew. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, the government covered 90% of the budget; in the 
1980s, 84%; and in the 1990s and 2000s, 60%. Today government funding covers 57% of the total budget. As a 
result of the decrease in government funding, tuition gradually increased by 50% from 2002 to 2012. At present, the 
Canadian government awards most of the budget as grants for projects, covering 50% of project costs. This funding 
model, called the "Cost Sharing Model", requires governments of the provinces to invest their own money in order 
to receive the support of the federal government. If the province chooses to cut costs, federal funding will diminish 
accordingly. As a result, institutions must find funding in the province government or private resources (Canadian 
Federation of Students, 2013). In addition to its part in covering costs, from 2004 and due to pressure from the 
provinces, the government decided to transfer budgets to institutions of higher education in the form of block grants. 
This budget is provided in only two fields - health (Canada Health Transfer) and social sciences (Canada Social 
Transfer). The federal government transfers funds to institutions to develop these programs, but, in practice, there is 
no mechanism supervising the allocation of these resources within the institution and it is free to channel the funds 
as it sees fit (Canadian Federation of Students, 2013). 
 
 Funding for research comes from the federal government and is allocated by three different agencies (see 
Appendix 2) - The Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), the Networks of Centers of Excellence of 
Canada (NCE), and the Canada Foundation for Innovation (CFI). Universities and researchers submit requests to the 
various agencies who grant scholarships or funds according to the research plan. Each agency has its own criteria 
and requirements for funding research projects. 
 
 Due to the federal budgeting method, performance is evaluated on the provincial level rather than on the 
federal level. For example, in the Province of Alberta, some 13 performance indicators have been introduced since 
1996 to determine the scale of the budget, including, among other things, number of students, satisfaction of 
graduates, employment rate of graduates, demand for the program, costs of the program, etc. Public colleges, in 
contrast, have only five indicators for determining the scale of annual government grants. An institution of higher 
education in Alberta can increase its core budgets by up to C$1.5 million if it meets the criteria (Sharma, 2004). 
Nonetheless, the significance of performance-based funding is relatively marginal. It is a bonus or a prize awarded 
to schools rather than a reliable source of funding. 
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Europe 
 
 Beginning in the 1980s, the European system of higher education was required to incorporate changes in its 
method of budgeting institutions and research. These requirements created a system that stresses, today more than 
ever, external funding of universities, competition between institutions, and the need for a more practical and 
economic approach to evaluating research and teaching outcomes (Tammi, 2009). In general, it is possible to 
describe the European model as characterized by high commitment to research and development and extensive 
investment of public funds in higher education (Docampo, 2007). Nonetheless, over the years the outcome-based 
funding approach emerged in many European countries as well. At present, funding methods in Europe are highly 
diverse; some countries adhere to the traditional model while others have chosen to fully embrace outcome-based 
funding. 
 
UK 
 
 Higher education in the UK is funded by a double system of support that combines general funding of the 
institution with grants and contracts. The Higher Education Funding Council (HEFCE) is responsible for funding 
and for evaluation of the institutions' performance. Over the last decade this agency developed methods for 
evaluating research that are considered the most advanced in Europe (Tapper & Salter, 2004) as well as methods for 
evaluating the quality of teaching (for a more extensive review see: Cave, 1997). In principle, the country channels 
24% of the total budget to research and 76% to teaching. Allocation of budgets to each institution for research is 
achieved by evaluating the quality of research, both on the level of the individual researcher and on the institutional 
and national level. The Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) is part of the HEFCE and is responsible for the 
evaluation. The RAE rates the quality of the research units - a rating that forms the basis for HEFCE resource 
allocation. The evaluation process makes no distinction between applied research and theoretical research, which 
receive the same weight. For example, applied research in medicine receives the same grading as research in the 
humanities. The evaluation process uses the peer review method, with university research activities divided into six 
units of assessment (UoA). A group of 6-15 experts, who form the reviewer panel of the research unit, is responsible 
for each unit. Each year the panel receives detailed information on the faculty's performance - scientific 
publications, number of research students, details of revenues and external funding sources, description of the 
research environment, and more. Based on this information, the panel reviewers assess the quality of each 
department on a scale of one to five stars. The global funding of each unit is determined by this rating (HEFCE, 
2012). The directives limit the average number of publications per department to four publications a year for each 
faculty member as part of the policy that seeks to emphasize quality over quantity and to limit what the British call 
"rush publications". 
 
 Funding of the teaching component is covered by student tuition and by the global grant awarded to 
institutions by the HEFCE. The size of the grant is determined by indicators evaluating the teaching component. The 
main indicator is the number of students from the UK or the European Union (foreign students are not counted). In 
addition, institutions receive funding according to the number of students who complete their studies. Budgeting by 
the number of students is differential depending on the various subjects and levels. For example, science students 
who need a laboratory will receive higher funding and students for advanced degrees will receive higher funding 
than students for lower degrees (HEFCE, 2012). In addition, the UK Quality Assurance Agency follows the Quality 
Code for Higher Education which includes, among other things, nine indicators for assessing the quality of teaching 
at the various institutions, constituting a type of declaration about the requirements. Two examples are: “Higher 
education providers articulate and implement a strategic approach to learning and teaching (a goal- and outcome-
based approach) and promote a shared understanding of this approach among their staff, students and other 
stakeholders" (Indicator 1) and “Learning and teaching activities and associated resources provide every student 
with an equal and effective opportunity to achieve the intended learning outcomes" (Indicator 2).  The code provides 
standards demanded of academic institutions. These are "the system of expectations required of all institutions of 
higher education in the UK" (HEFCE, 2012). The Quality Assurance Agency that monitors the work of the 
institutions uses this code as a main reference point for assessing the institutions and for writing its reports. 
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Norway, Sweden, And Switzerland 
 
 In Norway, as in many European countries, tuition is very low or nonexistent, with all funding coming 
from taxes. For this reason, in 2003 a "quality reform" was enacted, with the aim of linking government funding of 
the institutions to performance in teaching and research (Nyborg, 2002). In the new reform, the budget is divided as 
follows: 25% of the budget, on average, is awarded based on teaching outcomes; 60% based on research outcomes; 
and 15% based on the institution's basic expenditures. The teaching component is budgeted by the number of 
students who pass their exams and the number of degrees awarded (Frolich & Strom, 2008). The research 
component is budgeted by outcome indicators that include the proportion of doctorate degrees awarded (30%), 
funding provided by the European Union (20%), funding provided by the Research Authority (20%), and number of 
scientific publications (30%) (see Appendix 3) (Fägerlind & Strömqvist, 2004). 
 
 In Sweden, the resource-based budgeting model was implemented in 1993. In regard to the teaching 
component, each institution receives resources based on the annual number of both registered and graduating 
students. Nevertheless, each institution has a budget ceiling for the teaching component such that beyond a certain 
sum, the institution receives no added funds for admitting students. Institutions may allocate the resources to the 
different faculties as they see fit. Internal allocation of resources is usually performed in the "uniform price tag" 
method such that each field has a set budget. For example, there is a difference between the budgeting of the 
teaching component in the social sciences versus the humanities or the exact sciences. Courses are budgeted 
according to their discipline and not according to their study level, location, or size. Some claim that such a 
budgeting policy causes institutions to hesitate to develop innovative or experimental courses anticipated to have a 
low number of credits (Fägerlind & Strömqvist, 2004). In contrast to budgeting of the teaching component, the 
budgeting of the research component in Sweden is very competitive. Research funding is channeled by the National 
Research Embassy (NRS), which receives requests and proposals from researchers operating in traditional and non-
traditional institutions of higher education (Fägerlind & Strömqvist, 2004). Allocation of resources is based on the 
proposals and the task orientations submitted by researchers and institutions and is limited to certain fields. 
Accordingly, resources are not allocated equally to the different disciplines. 
 
 In Switzerland, most of the universities' funding comes from the government and consists of 85% of the 
entire budget. This budget does not depend on performance and is awarded to the institution annually on a regular 
basis, aside from accumulative changes determined by the government. The prevalent approach in Switzerland is 
that maintaining regular resource allocation ensures academic freedom, perceived as an essential condition for 
research stemming from inquisitiveness and long-term development (Liefner, 2003). This outlook is also embraced 
within the institutions as internal distribution of the budget is based on the number of lecturers in the department and 
faculty. Lecturers' positions are usually constant and, therefore, the internal distribution of the budget, as well, 
remains more or less constant (Liefner, 2003). Thus, in Switzerland, there is no implementation of performance 
indicators – neither for teaching nor for research. 
 
 In Finland, the new Universities Act was enacted in 1997, increasing the internal autonomy of universities 
while at the same time setting an outcome-based model assimilated in the internal resource allocation model of the 
universities. This act introduced competition into the universities, although some claim that it was externally 
enforced (Tammi, 2009). Budgeting in Finland, also called "outcome-based budgeting", is a government 
implemented approach to resource allocation, whereby budgets are awarded based on achievements and outcomes. 
In Finland, there is no separation between budgeting for teaching and for research. There are several indicators 
determined as outcome measures which include, among other things, the number of doctoral students, the number of 
master's students, the number of credits taught by lecturers, the scope of external funding, and the number of 
publications. Based on these measures, the Ministry of Education first allocates a budget for each university and 
then a budget for each faculty and department. Due to this budgeting method, each university, faculty, and 
department is required to retain an enormous amount of data that constitute empirical measures of the resources 
invested and the outcomes and applications attained (Fägerlind & Strömqvist, 2004). 
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Germany 
 
 The government budget forms the majority of the higher education budget in Germany. This budget 
constitutes 80% of all revenues of the institutions, while 18% come from external funding and only 2% from 
operational profits. Due to the high dependency on government funding, from the 1990s the federated states 
(Länder) began to implement outcome-based models in higher education. In principle, every independent state can 
make its own decisions about allocating resources; therefore, there is no single German model. Nonetheless, 11 of 
the 16 states use a funding formula for resource allocation (see Appendix 4). For example, in Hesse and 
Brandenburg, 95% of the budget is awarded based on performance indicators, while in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
and Bavaria, only 5% are allocated thus (Orr, Jaeger & Schwarzenberger, 2007). 
 
 Regarding the teaching component, the most common performance indicators are the number of students 
and the number of MA students. These indicators are applied very diversely in the various institutions; for example, 
the number of students in the first semester, in several semesters, or the number of students currently studying in a 
certain discipline. Sometimes the indicators are applied only to students who earn degrees in the standard study 
duration determined for the discipline. In addition, some teaching-related performance indicators reflect 
international tendencies in education, such as the proportion of foreign students at the institution. With regard to the 
research component, the indicators focus mainly on the institutions’ revenues from external sources, with the type of 
source evaluated by importance. For example, public revenues have a higher weight than private sources of funding. 
Other prevalent indicators for evaluating research performance are the number of doctoral and post-doctoral 
students. Surprisingly, the number of scientific publications serves as a measure of performance only in Bavaria, as 
of 2005. In general, most German universities emphasize teaching more than research due to a lack of consensus 
regarding the proper weight of various publications (Orr et al., 2007). 
 
Russia 
 
 The budgeting of higher education in Russia, similar to the other former Soviet states, is fully supported by 
government funding. The prohibition against charging tuition is anchored in the Russian constitution, which states 
that students should not be charged tuition (Johnstone, Arora & Experton, 1998). Within this constitutional 
constraint, post-Soviet Russia was required to find ways of funding higher education. In 1992, it was determined 
that organizations and industries could be charged tuition – but not "real people". In 1994, it was determined that the 
number of those studying free of charge should not exceed 10% of all students registered. Despite the flexibility and 
the legal loopholes, Russian higher education still had to perform a series of cuts and changes in order to survive 
despite the lack of resources. 
 
 In 2003, a reform was enacted in the budgeting of Russian higher education in order to reduce the 
budgeting of local education and increase its efficiency, to decrease the burden on the taxpayer, and to transfer 
responsibility to the institutions and the students. Until that time, budgeting was global and federal. In 2003 an initial 
attempt was made to implement the performance-based budgeting method. The reform determined that institutions 
would be required to justify their budget by writing reports and reporting actual performance. Each institution was 
required to submit a yearly budget proposal based on annual goals and targets. The budget proposal is backed by a 
report listing the strategic goals of the institution, its general aims, the institution's functions, presenting input versus 
output, as well as performance indicators and goals. The government ministries approve the budget according to the 
correspondence between the required budget and the performance report (Timoshenko, 2011). The government also 
developed questionnaires aimed at evaluating this correspondence in reports submitted by the institutions. 
 
 Despite the attempt to include performance indicators in methods of resource allocation, little progress was 
achieved in linking performance to budget allocations, developing modes of reporting, and evaluating performance 
(Belyanova, Hovland & Lavrov, 2007). This means that, in practice, performance-based budgeting was not fully 
implemented in the country's higher education institutions. The main reason stated by Belyanova et al. (2007) for the 
difficulty in implementing the reform is the formulation of overly-general performance indicators that are hard to 
measure. Nonetheless, theoretically and fundamentally, Russia has set itself a goal of emulating the West's method 
of budgeting institutions of higher education, and this is evident in extensive legislation (Belyanova et al., 2007) 
aimed at linking government budgeting to the institutions' performance as much as possible. 
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Australia 
 
 Australia began to express interest in the connection between budgeting policies and resource allocation – 
and between academic achievements as early as the 1960s. This interest grew in the 1990s with the emphasis of 
policy research on outcomes in higher education (Sharma, 2004) and with the establishment of the agency for 
quality assurance of university outcomes (Australian Universities Quality Agency – AUQA). In some Australian 
universities, budgeting is on two levels - department and faculty, with the aim of combining the process of internal 
resource allocation and strategic planning. First, all the university’s revenues from all sources of funding - public 
and private - are evaluated. In addition, costs of project proposals and innovation that departments seek to develop 
are taken into consideration. The proposals reach the management, which considers the teaching costs of each 
department. The management decides which fields it wishes to develop and to fund. In 1999, when the budgeting 
method based on research outcome on the departmental level was first introduced, some departments were adversely 
affected. Therefore, a decision was made that, together with continued assimilation of outcome-based budgeting, 
competition for funding would be divided in two – on the research level (81% of the overall budget) and on the 
departmental level (19% of the overall budget).  
 
Budgeting of research was performed on a quarterly basis for research institutions and departments, based 
on outcome, while budgeting of Bachelor degree programs was based on teaching and learning and includes four 
identically-weighted indicators - evaluation of the subject, students' progress, employment rate of graduates, and 
placement of the faculty in the national teaching survey. Budgeting of the research component in Australia, as of 
1995, is based on number of publications, particularly those cited in the ISI. Criticism toward this type of evaluation 
was that this approach encourages quantity at the expense of quality. The new organization set itself a goal to 
evaluate research quality by implementing additional indicators, not including number of publications or citations. 
The organization examines extensive research activity, including not only publications, but also participation in 
conferences and publishing books. 
 
Israel's Budgeting Model 
 
 In Israel, higher education institutions receive most of their budget from the government in the form of an 
annual grant without requiring them to detail how this grant will be utilized and entitling them to use it at their 
exclusive discretion (aside from the obligation to provide full budgetary reports throughout the year). In addition to 
the global budgetary grant, each institution is also budgeted by outcome indicators. Unlike the global grant allocated 
for the regular operational expenditures of the institution, outcome-based budgeting is provided to each institution 
based on its performance (Council for Higher Education, 2012). The budgeting model operated by the universities 
includes two components - teaching and research. In the colleges, the budgeting model includes only the teaching 
component, adjusted to these institutions (Kirsch, 2010). In the teaching component, institutions are rewarded by 
how close they are to the student/faculty ratio determined by the PBC (21.5 for universities and 35.5 for colleges) 
and by the rate of graduates who complete their studies in the standard number of years. The institution's progress is 
examined annually, as well as its normative teaching budget, calculated by the number of students, the number of 
graduates, and the updated normative rates, multiplied by a formula that reflects how close the institution is to its 
goals. The closer the institution gets to the goal, the larger the relative part it receives of its normative teaching 
budget, up to a maximum of 100% of its normative budget when it reaches the goal. Evaluation of teaching 
outcomes is based only on data consisting of student numbers and disciplines. In the Israeli model, there are no 
indicators that refer to the quality of teaching, such as satisfaction surveys. The universities themselves hold such 
surveys each semester, but ranking of lecturers, faculties, or institutions for teaching holds no weight in the 
budgeting model. In the current model, the teaching component is evaluated quantitatively to cover the costs of 
teaching. The student/faculty ratio is considered an indicator that reflects the quality of teaching, under the 
assumption that the less students there are in a class, the better the quality of the teaching. 
 
 The research component is based on competitive resource allocation and calculated by the relative ratio 
between each university and all other universities in Israel. The five outcomes calculated according to the outcome 
rate are receiving competitive research funds (34.0%), receiving other research funds (15.0%), training research 
students for PhD degrees (15.0%), publications in scientific journals (34.0%), and MA graduates in the research 
track with thesis (2.0%). Each component has a relative weight reflecting its relative significance in determining 
Journal of International Education Research – Fourth Quarter 2014 Volume 10, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 287 The Clute Institute 
distribution of the budget. In this hierarchy, the two main outcomes in the research component are receiving 
competitive research funds and scientific publications. 
 
 Together, competitive funds and publications comprise about 68% of the outcome-based research budget, 
while the rest of the components comprise less than one-third of the entire budget. This budgeting model reflects an 
attempt to encourage research outcomes and particularly outcomes perceived as "representing a significant part of 
the outcomes of scientific work…while undergoing external academic judgment that is mostly international" 
(Council for Higher Education, 2012, p. 69). 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Table 2 lists possible criteria for budgeting the component of enhancing teaching quality in Israeli 
institutions of higher education. The individual pricing of each component should be performed by professional 
entities such as the PBC staff. This proposal does not seek to replace the existing Israeli system structuring the 
teaching and research components. The proposal suggests an addition to the current budget, based on the quality of 
teaching as measured by several parameters listed in Table 2. 
 
 Other indicators that should be used to measure the quality of learning are the rate of graduates who 
continue to MA and PhD degrees; the mean achievements on entrance exams to MA studies, where relevant, such as 
the GRE Psychology test; and the rate of graduates licensed in their professions, where relevant, such as law, 
accounting, etc. The problem is that Israel has no uniform national entrance exams in most disciplines and therefore 
they cannot be used to compare between institutions. 
 
Table 2:  Suggested Criteria For Budgeting The Component 
Of Enhancing The Quality Of Teaching In Israeli Institutions Of Higher Education 
 Activity Budget Key 
Personnel A faculty member with a PhD in education and a teacher's 
certificate should be in charge of the quality of teaching at 
the institution. 
Part-time position 
Staff: teaching advisors, teaching and ICT (information 
and communication technology) division, video team 
One position 
Promoting Processes Of 
Teaching And Evaluation 
 
*Hours Of Contact= No. 
Of Workshop 
Participants Multiplied 
By No. Of Workshop 
Hours 
Feedback on faculty members' level of teaching No. of students, rate of respondents, 
statistical processing 
Workshops for improving teaching 
 
Continuing education programs and study days 
 
Personal support and individual guidance for faculty 
*Number of faculty members who 
participated in workshops every year 
*Number of contact hours received by 
faculty members* 
*No. of teaching assistants and lab 
assistants at the workshops 
*No. of contact hours of teaching 
assistants, etc. 
*Group workshops by faculty/school, by 
new and veteran faculty members, by 
feedback – to advance the faculty 
*No. of participants in individual guidance 
*No. of hours of individual guidance 
Activities for encouraging excellence in teaching: 
appreciation certificates, publicizing outstanding workers, 
examples of good teaching on the internet, financial 
reward for faculty members for excellence 
*Number of outstanding lecturers 
*Proportion of outstanding lecturers, no. 
of financial reward recipients, total sum of 
rewards 
 Checking exams 
 
*Multi-choice type: scanning exams and generating grade 
reports – including scanning multi-choice forms and 
generating reports of scores and of various statistical data. 
 
*Open-ended type of exam 
 
Bettering exams while maintaining their reliability 
* No. of students, guidance for writing 
exams, statistical processing 
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(including helping faculty members develop multi-choice 
exams). 
 
Steps are taken to prevent grade inflation on the level of 
the institution (in the institution's regulations and not only 
incidental examples). 
Producing Study 
Materials 
Help and support with publication of teaching materials 
(readers and textbooks) 
*No. of textbooks published each year, no. 
of readers 
Integration Of 
Technologies In Teaching 
Use of technologies to advance teaching, videotaping 
classes for students, videotaping classes to advance 
lecturer's evaluation 
*No. of courses videotaped in full, 
average no. of semester hours of these 
courses 
ICT study materials – their use by no. of 
courses in the system, number of lecturers, 
nature of materials 
Advancing And 
Improving Learning 
Academic support of students with the aim of preventing 
dropout, personal training, "group heads" – students tutor 
students 
*No. of student tutors, total no. of hours 
tutored per year 
Quality Assessment The center's activities are accompanied by assessment 
studies aimed at improving, developing, and measuring 
the effectiveness of each project, coordinating quality 
assessment and teaching advancement processes, graduate 
surveys to follow the effectiveness of learning and its 
outcomes (their success in the field), comparative surveys 
in a certain discipline between parallel Israeli departments 
*Workshops, study days, statistical 
processing, number of questionnaires 
processed 
Research activity in a 
certain discipline 
Encouraging research and research grants in this 
discipline. Initiatives for inter-school collaboration in this 
discipline in Israel and abroad. Leading educational 
projects and conducting research 
*No. of articles published by the faculty 
on academic teaching and its advancement 
in Israel and abroad 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 A review of public policy on the funding and budgeting of higher education institutions in Israel and abroad 
shows that most institutions use outcome indicators, to some degree, in order to determine the allocation of 
resources. Outcome indicators constitute a means for evaluating the two main functions of universities - teaching 
and research. Evaluation of the quality of teaching is performed by a wide variety of indicators, which include the 
number of students, the rate of graduates (Archibald & Feldman, 2008), the rate of those employed, satisfaction of 
graduates, grades on licensing exams, etc. Evaluation of the quality of research is measured by indicators such as the 
number of publications in scientific journals, the number of citations, scope of external funds, participation in 
conferences, and more (Shin, 2010). 
 
 Table 3 summarizes the main criteria for performance-based budgeting in institutions of higher education 
in several countries. In international rankings of academic institutions, indicators refer mainly to research outcomes 
and less to learning outcomes. This table is not related to budgeting, but it gives an indication of the parameters that 
serve to measure academic excellence. It is interesting to compare between the US and Russia in their attitude to 
teaching. In the US, PhDs who teach in schools of higher education are not required to have a teaching certificate or 
teaching-specific training, but the quality of their teaching is evaluated by American students. In contrast, in Russia 
PhDs are required to have a teaching certificate, but the quality of their teaching is not evaluated by Russian 
students. This indicates a paradox, a contrast between the demands for training versus the demand for student 
evaluation in the two countries. 
 
 Considering the current budgeting model in Israel, Israeli student organizations claim that the model gives 
insufficient attention to encouraging advancement of the quality of teaching; namely, not enough attention is given 
to the quality of teaching in lectures, advanced learning methods, student feedback, etc. An index, such as student-
to-lecturer ratio (which has a major place in the budgeting model), does indeed mean smaller classrooms, albeit 
indirectly, but this is not necessarily so and the diversity is considerable, both in the number of teaching hours per 
lecturer and in classroom size.  
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Table 3:  Main Criteria For Performance-Based Budgeting Of Institutions Of Higher Education In Several Countries 
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US 
 
v V v  x x x 
  
Varies 
significantly 
between states 
Canada v 
 
V 
 
X X  X v 
Graduate 
satisfaction 
Given as bonus 
in addition to 
basic budget 
UK v v 
  
x x  x 
  
Limited to 4 
publications per 
person annually 
Norway v v 
  
x x x x 
  
 
Sweden v v 
  
 x x x x 
 
 
Germany v 
  
v X    
 
Proportion of 
foreign students 
in the school 
 
Australia 
   
V 
 
   X 
Evaluation of 
the program's 
subject 
Placement of 
faculty in 
national 
teaching survey 
Student 
progress  
Participation in 
conferences and 
publishing 
books 
 
Russia     X      
Required to 
submit 
performance 
report to federal 
government 
Israel v v 
 
v v v v v By discipline 
Payment by 
student/faculty 
ratio set by PBC 
(21.5 at univ. 
and 35.5 at 
colleges) 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1:  Common Performance Indicators In US Higher Education (From Toutkoushian & Danielson, 2002) 
Category Common Performance Indicators 
Input Student headcounts 
Percentage from underrepresented race/ethic group 
Average SAT/ACT scores of freshmen 
High school GPA or class rank of freshmen 
Percentage of applicants who are admitted 
Percentage of admitted students who enroll 
Average faculty salaries 
Production Process  Expenditures per student 
Student-to-faculty ratio 
Credit hours per faculty member 
Percentage of courses/students taught by tenure-track faculty 
Expenditures per student by major Category 
Revenues per student by major Category 
Level of deferred maintenance 
Output Number of faculty publications 
Number of degrees awarded 
Outcomes Reputational rankings (e.g. USNWR) 
Percentage of alumni who have donated to the institution 
Retention rates (2, 3 and/or 4 years) 
Graduation rates (4, 5 and/or 6 years) 
Average time to degree 
Research grant dollars received 
Student satisfaction (from surveys) 
 
Appendix 2:  Scope Of Funding Provided By The Three Research Agencies  
By Province In Canada (Higher Education Quality Council Of Ontario, 2013) 
Rank Province 
Funding Per 
Faculty 
Percentage Share 
Of Funding 
Percentage Of Canadian 
Population 
Total Funding 
1 QC $ 58,404 26% 24% $ 562.4M 
2 ON $ 52,648 40% 38% $ 858.5M 
3 BC $ 50,113 14% 13% $ 306.9M 
4 AB $ 39,820 9% 11% $ 193.0M 
5 SK $ 33,958 3% 3% $ 56.4M 
6 NS $ 28,656 3% 3% $ 62.2M 
7 MB $ 27,513 2% 4% $ 48.9M 
8 NL $ 24,043 1% 2% $ 22.7M 
9 NB $ 18,710 2% 2% $ 23.0M 
19 PE $ 12,808 0% 0% $ 3.2M 
Canada $ 47,561 100% 100% $ 2,137.1M 
Sources: CIHR Search Engine, NSERC Search Engine, SSHRC Search Engine And Statistic Canada. Table 477-0018-Number Of Full-Time 
Teaching Staff At Canadian Universities, Canada, Provinces, Annual, CANSIM Database. Census Canada, 2011 
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Appendix 3:  The Weight Of Various Indicators (%) 
In Performance-Based Budgeting At Norwegian Institutions Of Higher Education (Adapted From Schmidt, 2012) 
 
 
Appendix 4:  Proportion Of Outcome-Based Budget 
In Each Of The German Federated States (From Orr Et Al., 2007) 
Bavaria 3% 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 3% 
Bremen 5% 
North Rhine-Westphalia 14% 
Berlin 15% 
Thuringia 15% 
Baden-Wurttemberg 21% 
Hamburg 88% 
Hessen 95% 
Brandenburg 95% 
Rhineland-Palatinate 95% 
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